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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. C 04-1511 CW

IN RE ABBOTT LABORATORIES NORVIR  
ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION

ORDER CERTIFYING  
ISSUES AND GRANTING  
LEAVE TO SEEK  
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

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Defendant Abbott Laboratories manufactures ritonavir, which it sells as Norvir, a protease inhibitor (PI) used to combat HIV infection. When used in small quantities with another PI, Norvir increases the efficacy of that PI. Norvir is unique among PIs in this respect, and is widely prescribed for use as a "booster."

Abbott also manufactures Kaletra, a single pill that contains the PI lopinavir as well as ritonavir (Norvir), which is used to boost the effects of lopinavir. Although effective and widely used, Kaletra causes some patients to experience significant side effects. In 2003, two new PIs were introduced to the market. These PIs were as effective as Kaletra, and were more convenient. Following their release, Kaletra's market share fell.

1       On December 3, 2003, Abbott raised the wholesale price of  
2 Norvir by 400 percent (representing a \$6.84 increase per 100-mg  
3 daily dose) while keeping the price of Kaletra constant.  
4 Plaintiffs contend that the price increase in the "booster market,"  
5 which consists solely of Norvir, was an illegal effort to create or  
6 maintain a monopoly for Kaletra in the "boosted market," which  
7 Plaintiffs define as the market for those PIs that are prescribed  
8 for use with Norvir as a booster.

9       Plaintiffs sued for monopolization and attempted  
10 monopolization in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. They have  
11 proceeded under the monopoly leveraging theory described in Image  
12 Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th  
13 Cir. 1997). Under this theory, "a monopolist who acquires a  
14 dominant position in one market through patents and copyrights may  
15 violate § 2 if the monopolist exploits that dominant position to  
16 enhance a monopoly in another market." Id. at 1216. Plaintiffs  
17 also sued for violation of the California Unfair Competition Law  
18 and for unjust enrichment.

19       During the course of this litigation, the Court has issued a  
20 number of orders ruling on the various legal issues relating to  
21 Plaintiffs' claims. After more than four years of litigation, the  
22 parties wish to avoid trial and have reached a negotiated  
23 agreement. The Court's legal rulings are now the only real  
24 contested issues remaining. Under the agreement, regardless of the  
25 outcome of the appeal, Abbott will pay \$10 million, seventy percent  
26 of which will be deposited into a cy pres fund and distributed to  
27 non-profit organizations that benefit individuals with HIV/AIDS.  
28 The remaining thirty percent will be allocated to indirect

1 purchaser class members who purchased Norvir in California and file  
2 valid claims. The agreement will go into effect if this Court  
3 certifies an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)  
4 and the Ninth Circuit allows Abbott to take such an appeal with  
5 respect to at least two out of three specific issues discussed in  
6 the Court's orders dated October 21, 2004, March 2, 2005,<sup>1</sup> July 6,  
7 2006 and May 16, 2008,<sup>2</sup> each of which denied a dispositive motion  
8 by Abbott. If Abbott prevails on appeal, the \$10 million will not  
9 be returned and no trial will be held. If Abbott fails to prevail  
10 on appeal, it will not proceed to trial, but will pay an additional  
11 \$17.5 million to the cy pres fund.

12 Specifically, Abbott wishes to contest the following rulings  
13 of the Court:

14 1) That, even though Abbott possesses a patent for  
15 Norvir, under Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,  
16 457 U.S. 465 (1982), Plaintiffs are not precluded as  
17 a matter of law from establishing an antitrust  
18 injury by virtue of their paying a "penalty" in the  
19 form of an increased price for Norvir in the  
20 leveraging market if they choose to use a boosted PI  
21 that competes with Kaletra, where Plaintiff contends  
22 the price increase was designed to create or  
23 maintain a monopoly in the leveraged market.

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25 <sup>1</sup>The order of March 2, 2005 denying Abbott's motion to dismiss  
26 was filed in case No. C 04-4203, which was subsequently  
consolidated with the present case.

27 <sup>2</sup>The order of May 16, 2008 denying Abbott's motion for summary  
28 judgment incorporated by reference the Court's order denying  
Abbott's motions to dismiss in the related cases, Nos. 07-5985, 07-  
6010, 07-6118, 07-5470, 07-5702 and 07-6120.

1           2) That Plaintiffs are not precluded as a matter of law from  
2 establishing at trial that Abbott possesses monopoly  
3 power over the market for PIs that are boosted by Norvir  
4 by showing that Abbott successfully used exclusionary  
5 pricing to slow a market share decline, even though some  
6 existing competitors have increased both their market  
7 share and their prices since the Norvir price increase.  
8           3) That to succeed on their monopoly leveraging claim based  
9 on Abbott's unilateral pricing conduct, Plaintiffs are  
10 not required to show that the imputed price of the  
11 lopinavir portion of Kaletra is below Abbott's average  
12 variable cost of producing it, notwithstanding the Ninth  
13 Circuit's decision in Cascade Health Solutions v.  
14 PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008), which held  
15 that, in an antitrust action based on a theory of  
16 exclusionary bundled discounting, the plaintiffs must  
17 ordinarily demonstrate that the imputed price of the  
18 competitive product in the bundle is below the average  
19 variable cost of producing it.

20           A district court may certify appeal of interlocutory orders  
21 only if three factors are present. First, the issue to be  
22 certified must involve a "controlling question of law." 28 U.S.C.  
23 § 1292(b). Second, there must be "substantial ground for  
24 difference of opinion" on the issue. Id. Third, it must be likely  
25 that an interlocutory appeal will "materially advance the ultimate  
26 termination of the litigation." Id.

27           The orders from which Abbott seeks an interlocutory appeal  
28 involve controlling questions of law, in that each of the three

1 issues identified above, if decided in its favor, is case-  
2 dispositive. In addition, considering the novelty of the legal  
3 theories presented in this case and the lack of precedent directly  
4 on point, there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as  
5 to the proper resolution of the issues on appeal. An immediate  
6 appeal would also materially advance the ultimate termination of  
7 the litigation, in that it would trigger the agreement between the  
8 parties, thereby obviating the need for trial, regardless of the  
9 outcome of the appeal, and eliminating the possibility of another  
10 appeal at a later date.

11       Although the Court previously denied a request to certify one  
12 of these issues for interlocutory appeal, the balance of the  
13 factors is changed by the fact that the parties have resolved their  
14 other differences so that there would be no trial or second appeal  
15 following the interlocutory appeal. Moreover, the resolution of  
16 these questions on appeal would also be helpful in clarifying the  
17 issues in the related antitrust cases brought against Abbott by  
18 direct purchasers and by one of its competitors. Those cases are  
19 still in the early stages of litigation.

20       For these reasons, the Court will permit Abbott to apply to  
21 the Ninth Circuit for an interlocutory appeal of the orders  
22 specified above, and recommends that the appeal be permitted.

23       IT IS SO ORDERED.

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25 Dated: 8/27/08

*Claudia Wilken*

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26 CLAUDIA WILKEN  
27 United States District Judge  
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